The Structural Role of the Subject in Categorical Propositions and Its Existential Import

Abstract

Logic, as a system designed to distinguish between right and wrong, necessitates that all judgments pertain to a “thing.” In categorical propositions, this judgment is anchored in the “thing,” which is represented by the term “subject.” The subject serves as the foundational element upon which the entire logical system is built. Within the classical tradition of logic, it is widely accepted that only affirmative propositions presuppose the existence of their subjects. However, for a judgment to be formed within a proposition, the subject must refer to an existent. This study examines the debates within the classical tradition regarding the existence of the subject in propositions and questions its existential significance based on these discussions. The existence of the subject holds pivotal importance in classical logic for several reasons. For example, to establish a contradiction between two propositions, the “unity of subject”—one of the eight conditions for contradiction—requires that the same subject be used in both propositions. Furthermore, the study explores the discussions between Farabi and Ibn Sina regarding the actuality and possibility of the individuals to which the subject refers, evaluating their approaches to the possible individuals denoted by the subject. At its core, analyzing the ontological implications of the subject is essential for assessing the coherence and consistency of the logical system.